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INTRODUCTION 
The critical time horizon for most American lay-investors is the 
length of their career. Today’s America is one in which workers are losing 
significant financial assistance from pensions or Social Security, and so 
they must save—and invest those savings—in their own retirement 
accounts. The challenges of this project are enormous. As a population, 
Americans save too little and invest what little they do save unwisely. The 
explanations for these shortcomings are numerous: our educational system 
offers little coherent financial education to investors, and the task of saving 
is not one at which people can easily become experts on their own. As 
Richard Thaler has noted, wryly, humans do not have many ways to 
improve at this project because “when it comes to saving for retirement, 
barring reincarnation we do that exactly once.”1 
Though not every financial observer believes the United States will 
soon face problematic shortfalls in our system of saving,2 a great many 
do.3 Data on the income and assets of America’s retirees reveal a complex 
picture of a heterogeneous population. Today, older Americans are, in 
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aggregate, a wealthy cohort, flush with a lifetime of savings and buoyed 
by a felicitous rise in real estate values. Yet, four million elderly 
Americans are individually poor. 
The circumstances of the impending ten-year cohort of workers 
preparing to retire, those aged fifty-five to sixty-four, however, is clearer: 
they enjoy a lower incidence of defined benefit pensions and markedly 
fewer personal savings. They and those who will follow them—many with 
no savings whatsoever—are headed for more serious financial difficulties. 
Large numbers of people will have to work many more years than 
expected, often in difficult jobs, while enduring impoverished retirements. 
Possible solutions to this problem generally fall into three broad 
categories: (1) expand defined benefits, such as by buttressing or 
expanding Social Security4 or by introducing “guaranteed retirement 
accounts”;5 (2) increase personal savings by using behavioral techniques 
to enroll workers automatically in 401(k) accounts, to contribute 
automatically to those accounts, and to select default investments other 
than cash;6 and (3) do nothing out of indifference or disagreement with the 
existence or magnitude of the problem. 
My focus is upon the second approach: increasing personal savings 
by improving our current system of defined contribution accounts. 
Existing behavioral work on enhancing accumulation through automatic 
enrollment and automatic escalation is insightful, effective, and already 
comprehensive. Yet, even if we successfully implement these proposals 
and amass greater savings, the resulting investments and their future 
earning potential may nevertheless be squandered due to shortcomings 
within existing defined contribution plans and our inexpert use of them. 
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve 
the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I 
begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined 
contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first 
being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely 
on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of state-
based retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in 
a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be 
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superior, either alternative approach would be an improvement over our 
current system. 
I. PROBLEMS WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS 
Like the complaint of Woody Allen’s two elderly women talking 
about the food at a Catskill mountain resort, a significant problem with 
401(k) plans is that they may be both “really terrible” and available in 
“such small portions.”7 That is, while many 401(k) plans suffer from a 
litany of shortcomings, over 68 million Americans work for employers 
who offer no retirement plan whatsoever (and thus enjoy no access to 
valuable tax savings).8 
Both academic work by scholars, such as Ian Ayres and Quinn 
Curtis, and recent litigation by firms, such as Schlichter Bogard & Denton, 
have identified a variety of problems in defined contribution plans. In their 
2015 study, Ayres and Curtis argued that fees and menu offerings in many 
401(k) plans “lead to a cost of seventy-eight basis points in excess of index 
funds.”9 “Fees are so high” in sixteen percent of the plans Ayres and Curtis 
analyzed “they consume[d] the tax benefits of investing in a 401(k) for a 
young employee.”10 
Similarly, Schlichter Bogard has alleged a suite of other problems 
with employer contribution plans in lawsuits against Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, and John Deere, and more recently against major universities, 
such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, and 
Yale University.11 Specifically, Schlichter Bogard alleged excessive 
administrative costs, the inclusion of unnecessarily expensive share 
classes of mutual funds, too many fund choices, and selections of 
conflicted investment advisors.12 If these allegations are true, the 
administrators of the employers’ plans certainly have made poor—and 
easily avoidable—choices on behalf of their employees. 
Certainly, the state of defined contribution plans in the United States 
could be improved. Indeed, even if one does not believe there is a current 
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or impending retirement crisis, improvements to our system of saving 
could—costs and benefits permitting—be a welcome boon to millions of 
Americans. 
II. PROPOSAL I: CREATE A NATIONAL THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN 
An ideal defined contribution plan would be one managed by an 
experienced investment advisor offering a limited selection of high-quality 
investments at low fees. Happily, such a plan already exists: the Thrift 
Savings Plan (TSP).13 
The TSP is the defined contribution plan for federal employees; 4.9 
million14 of whom use it to invest an aggregate of $495 billion.15 The plan 
is managed by the world’s largest private asset manager, BlackRock, 
which offers ten prudent investment options and charges an average fee of 
just 3.8 basis points.16 For comparison, the average 401(k) fee that private 
sector employees currently pay is sixty-seven basis points.17 
I reiterate my proposal that we allow all American workers to invest 
in the TSP.18 Or, if current TSP participants object to the rise in fees that 
such an influx of participants would inevitably cause, then I propose we 
create another federal plan just like it (which we can call TSP-II). 
A. Implementation 
To implement this proposal, Congress could use its constitutional 
power to regulate interstate commerce to amend the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 with the addition of a few salient provisions. 
First, employers of more than a de minimis number of employees—
say, five—would be required to enroll their employees automatically in 
TSP-II accounts unless those employees opt out of the plan. Accordingly, 
the universe of covered employers could be either just those who do not 
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offer their own retirement plan (who, again, employ 68 million workers)19 
or all employers (with 124 million full-time and 27 million part-time 
employees).20 Alternatively, TSP-II implementation could begin with a 
narrower category of employers and, if successful, subsequently expand 
to the broader one. 
After enrollment, covered employers would submit, together with 
their usual tax withholdings, regular default contributions of three percent 
of each employee’s salary to TSP-II. Like the TSP, employers would be 
permitted—but not required—to match contributions in line with existing 
limits. As a default, funds in each employee’s TSP-II account would be 
invested in a target-date fund keyed to their projected retirement date. 
Over time, the employees’ contributions would automatically and 
incrementally escalate from the initial three percent figure until they reach 
a cap of ten percent. Employees could, of course, decline to participate in 
TSP-II or change each of these settings. 
Unemployed or self-employed workers who wish to participate could 
enroll directly in TSP-II and link their bank accounts to deposit 
contributions automatically in their TSP-II account. On issues of tax 
deferment and withdrawals, TSP-II savings would be treated in the same 
manner as all assets in 401(k) plans. Should employees lose or change 
jobs, they would maintain their existing TSP-II account. 
The new plan would be overseen by the Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Board, which currently administers the existing TSP.21 Or, if 
that board objected to these additional duties, a new body could be 
constituted with oversight of TSP-II, following the TSP model. Investment 
management and administrative services (such as furnishing account 
statements, maintaining websites, staffing toll-free telephone numbers, 
and providing the usual complement of tasks required by individual 
accounts) could, as is the case with the TSP, be outsourced to private 
vendors.22 
B. Potential Benefits 
1. Prudent Investment Options 
For at least two possible reasons, many defined contribution plans 
offer participants a menu with poor investment options—options that are 
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unsuitable for the project of long-term investing, unnecessarily expensive, 
or simply too numerous. The first reason is simply a lack of sophistication 
on the part of the employer. A company may not internally possess the 
investment expertise necessary to make good choices for their plans or to 
evaluate the choices proposed by third-party vendors. 
The second reason is that an employer may receive compensation 
from vendors in exchange for the inclusion of inferior investment options. 
If, for instance, an employer agrees to hire, say, Fidelity to administer the 
company’s 401(k) plan, and Fidelity includes a number of expensive 
Fidelity funds in the plan’s menu, Fidelity might then agree to share a 
portion of the revenue it earns as the advisor of those funds with the 
employer. Such arrangements exist and have been litigated.23 
Highly specialized, undiversified, and expensive funds are, one 
hopes, self-evidently bad choices for workers attempting to save prudently 
over a several-decade time horizon. Perhaps less obviously, the inclusion 
of too many choices on a 401(k) menu is also imprudent. Studies have 
demonstrated that offering too many options to consumers—including 
investors—can have a stultifying effect on the purported beneficiaries.24 
One analysis has found that for every ten additional choices included on a 
401(k) menu, participation in the plan drops by 1.5%–2%.25 According to 
the study, the average plan with thirty options yielded a participation rate 
of seventy percent, but when those options were increased to fifty-six, 
participation fell to sixty-one percent.26 
The TSP offers just ten investment options: five target-date funds, 
four broad-based index funds, and one fund invested exclusively in 
Treasury securities.27 Hewing to that model, TSP-II would provide access 
to such a prudent array of choices for a massive number of Americans. 
Indeed, a universal TSP-II would allow employees to reject their 
employer’s plan menu, if it were inferior, in favor of these choices. 
2. Professional & Monitored Management 
While the TSP may be easily derided or dismissed as simply “a 
government plan” (with all the stigma that appellation carries in certain 
quarters) management of the TSP’s investments is decidedly not 
“government work.” BlackRock, the firm that currently serves as the TSP 
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advisor, professionally manages over five trillion dollars28 and enjoys a 
sterling reputation in the private sector investing community. Should the 
performance of TSP-II’s funds ever lapse, the plan’s oversight board could 
replace BlackRock with an alternative top-flight private asset manager. 
And since the plan’s ten funds are uncomplicated and, in several cases, 
just simple index funds, each fund’s performance is readily comparable to 
other such funds offered by other large advisors, such as Vanguard and 
Fidelity. 
Moreover, because TSP-II would include millions of participants and 
have a high public profile, the performance of its manager would be 
subject to close public scrutiny. Beneath the gaze of thousands or millions 
of interested participants, managers have a harder time getting away with 
shoddy work. That scrutiny would extend beyond the simple performance 
of the funds and into less obvious management behavior, such as whether 
the advisor is churning fund assets to accumulate private gains with the 
brokers executing such trades; overweighting equity holdings in target-
date funds to earn the higher fees associated with underlying equity (rather 
than fixed income) investments; overvaluing any illiquid assets in the 
funds’ portfolios to inflate the fees it receives as a percentage of assets 
under management; or selectively disclosing the funds’ future trades to 
preferred outside clients with intentions of front-running TSP-II’s trades.29 
In contrast, our current system—comprising thousands of private 
defined contribution plans—gives participants fewer incentives, less 
information, and weaker market power to police such unfaithful behavior 
by investment managers. 
3. Low Fees 
Perhaps the most obvious and significant benefit of a TSP-II would 
be the enormous potential savings that millions of investors could enjoy 
from dramatically lower fees. 
Would TSP-II achieve fees as low as the 3.8 basis points in TSP?30 
Perhaps not. The low fees TSP boasts are a function of several factors that 
are unique to the TSP and may not exist in a TSP-II, at least not 
immediately. First, the TSP boasts huge economies of scale,31 and while a 
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TSP-II could grow to encompass a far greater number of participants and 
assets over time, it would not do so immediately. One should expect low 
average balances in the accounts of a TSP-II in its initial years until 
participants accumulate more substantial savings. Also, the members of 
TSP are all, by definition, federal employees (many of whom enjoy 
comparatively healthy salaries32) while a substantial percentage of TSP-II 
participants might be underemployed or low-salaried workers. Another 
relative advantage of TSP is the administrative efficiency that comes from 
its participants all working for a single employer with standardized 
policies, standardized procedures, and a common infrastructure,33 an 
advantage that would not be true in a TSP-II involving many different 
employers. Finally, and perhaps most saliently, significant TSP 
administrative duties are performed by employees on the federal payroll 
and thus are not borne by the plan itself,34 an arrangement that also might 
not be true in a TSP-II. 
On the other hand, TSP-II would cover a universe of possible 
participants far larger than the 4.8 million in TSP. But if we assume TSP-
II included only the unemployed, the self-employed, or employees of 
employers without plans, their average income—and thus the plan’s per 
capita account size—might always remain lower than TSP and thus less 
efficient. Over time, however, the significantly larger number of 
participants would be likely to accumulate larger aggregate savings. And, 
if TSP-II were instead available to all Americans, the plan would surely 
grow far larger than TSP. So, perhaps a TSP-II could someday enjoy fees 
even lower than 3.8 basis points. Consider also that investment advisors 
such as Vanguard already offer exchange-traded funds and mutual funds 
to retail investors and modestly sized institutions at rates not much higher 
than 3.8 basis points.35 Indeed, were America’s defined contribution plans 
to make far wider use of such investment offerings, the need for changes 
to our retirement system would be far lower. Unfortunately, they do not. 
In any event, the relevant comparison is to the fees employees 
currently pay in the plans of private employers, which are vastly higher36 
than TSP and, in any fair forecast, the TSP-II.  
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4. Proof of Concept & Political Feasibility 
The success of TSP is widely admired, and it serves as a successful 
proof of concept for TSP-II. Certainly, TSP-II would be more complicated 
by the inclusion of participants from so many different employers or from 
no employers at all. Yet, enrollment and participation in our current, 
heterogeneous landscape of private sector-defined contribution plans is 
easily managed electronically through websites and smartphone 
applications. With the preparation of enrollment and management 
websites, one can easily envision how the implementation of TSP-II could 
take place throughout the United States. 
 This plan is also more politically feasible in the short term—
particularly under unified Republican control of the federal government—
than any other plans to boost retirement accounts, particularly by 
increasing Social Security benefits. Indeed, the only presidential candidate 
to propose any retirement plan similar to this idea was a Republican: 
Marco Rubio.37 Other similar proposals have come from the Center for 
American Progress Action Fund38 and U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley (D-
OR),39 which suggests that a TSP-II could conceivably enjoy bipartisan 
support. 
5. TSP-II as Public Infrastructure 
A federal retirement plan could serve as a public good with benefits 
for private citizens and businesses like highways, railroads, public 
education, and other governmental infrastructure. If TSP-II became a 
reality, many American employers might choose to reduce corporate 
expenditures by dropping their own retirement plans and opting to 
participate in TSP-II.  
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To the extent that employers wish to compete more aggressively in 
the labor market, they could, of course, offer their own, more generous 
plans. Or they could choose an interim position, in which they offer no 
plan of their own but match a portion of their employees’ contributions to 
TSP-II. So, though there would be costs with automatically enrolling 
employees in the plan, those costs would likely be lower than managing a 
private plan for the employer and could be paid for out of plan assets. 
6. Data 
A large-scale retirement plan operated for the public good could also 
produce a tremendous flow of data that could be used to help citizens save 
more effectively for their retirement. For instance, if TSP-II engaged in 
A/B testing of its electronic interfaces, it might learn which presentations 
of information lead to greater rates of participation, contribution, and 
overall saving. Like Facebook, Amazon, Google, and the most effective 
private sector companies, TSP-II’s high volume of users would generate 
an enormous and important amount of testable information. 
TSP-II could use that data to improve services for its own 
participants, of course. And, as a public program, it could also provide 
those findings freely to private sector plan administrators or, indeed, to 
other government agencies (such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau), which could, 
in turn, consider mandating the implementation of successful approaches. 
Using and collecting this data is both possible and feasible because 
firms like Vanguard currently enjoy huge volumes of investors and assets 
and possess the ability to produce and process massive amounts of useful 
investment data.40 But, as private enterprises, their incentive is more likely 
to find ways of maximizing their profits, which may not be consistent with 
better retirement savings by the public at large. A firm that discovered 
ways to encourage investors to trade frequently might, for instance, 
generate profits sufficient to offset the reduced performance in those 
investors’ accounts. TSP-II, and indeed TSP, should and could compile 
and analyze its data for more publicly beneficial lessons. 
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C. Potential Drawbacks 
1. Monopsony 
If a government plan such as TSP-II were to suck up billions or 
trillions of dollars in retirement savings and deliver them into the hands of 
BlackRock, or any single asset manager, the broader investment industry 
could suffer competitively. The TSP-II manager, with its incredible 
concentration of assets, might dominate and possibly drive out 
competition. Indeed, the industry’s fear of this outcome—and their 
lobbying efforts to prevent it41—might explain the conspicuous absence of 
a TSP-II, even after thirty years of TSP success. Of course, the investing 
public might also worry that, as with any monopsony, should competition 
in the investing industry wither or disappear, the fees in a captured TSP-II 
could then rise dramatically in the future. 
This concern could be alleviated with a few adjustments. First, the 
manager of TSP-II could be rotated every few years, as the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act requires of corporate accountants.42 New managers could 
participate in an auction for the right to manage the plan for two or three 
years and then relinquish the role to another firm. Such substitutions 
might, however, inflict transition costs, investor confusion, or simple 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the benefits of rotating the administrator to 
prevent complacent abuse of the position could outweigh the transition 
costs. 
Alternatively, a more efficient and feasible option would be for the 
overall manager to retain the services of numerous sub-advisors for several 
of the plan’s funds. This sub-advisory structure is common in the private 
sector, with major fund families such as Vanguard holding auctions 
amongst other investment advisors for the financially rewarding privilege 
of advising massive Vanguard funds.43 The system allows the overall 
manager to operate with low costs since bidders, eager for the business 
opportunity, routinely offer to manage the funds at rates far lower than 
standard retail or institutional levels.44 It also allows the manager to 
assemble a “best-of-breed” array of funds, in which sub-advisors with 
particular expertise in, say, equities manage the equity fund, while another 
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shop particularly knowledgeable about bonds manages the fixed-income 
fund. 
Of course, many trillions of dollars in the United States and around 
the world are invested completely outside of the 401(k) system.45 So, even 
were TSP-II to enjoy great success, that success would be confined to 
retirement savings alone; conversely, any substantial harm to the broader 
investment industry due to centralized TSP-II management would be only 
marginal. 
2. Governmental Endorsement 
Any government plan—particularly one controlling trillions of 
private dollars—is likely to be resisted by many simply because of the 
stigma of the “public” label among libertarians and other groups skeptical 
of governmental involvement. Of course, the governmental nature of this 
plan does raise substantive issues, apart from political squeamishness. 
Those issues come in at least two flavors, each the opposite of the other.  
The first, and perhaps most salient fear is that any public savings plan 
carries an implicit promise by the government to not allow the investments 
to fail. Government bailouts of entirely private businesses are still a fresh 
memory in this country, so perhaps politicians would feel even greater 
pressure to prop up the savings in TSP-II should they suffer in an acute 
economic downturn. The laws and charter governing a federal plan could 
be drafted to make clear that such a backstop is impermissible, though such 
assurances can prove very hard to enforce. So perhaps the simplest and 
most effective rebuttal to this concern is the experience of the original 
TSP. In the three decades of its existence, which includes several notable 
market collapses, its funds have never been bailed out or augmented by 
the government. 
The second, opposite fear is that a public savings plan may be raided 
by the government. Should the government need access to funds, the 
temptation to raid a multi-trillion-dollar plan might be irresistible. Again, 
the experience of the TSP is instructive: it has never been touched in its 
lifetime. The reason for that impermeability may be that its funds are held 
in distinct, separate accounts by each of its participants, all of whom could 
see clearly whether and to what extent their personal funds had been 
reduced. The distributed and disaggregated nature of defined contribution 
accounts might be their best protection against an avaricious government. 
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3. Excessive Passive Investment 
Another concern about the success of a possible TSP-II would be the 
acceleration of the broader trend of passive investing, inasmuch as the plan 
would direct savings into indexed mutual funds. In recent years, passive 
index funds have grown dramatically and now hold substantial investment 
positions in many public corporations.46 The effects of this concentration 
of holdings in largely automated investments are not yet clear. But one 
can—and several law professors do—readily speculate about possible 
malign consequences to the governance or competitive behavior of 
operating companies in our economy. 
One initial study suggests that large blocks of airlines stocks 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of mutual funds has led to 
anticompetitive behavior in that industry.47 Widespread passive 
investment—such as through massive TSP-II funds—would ensure that 
the stocks of S&P 500 issuers will always find a ready, indeed an 
unthinkingly automatic, buyer. Managers of those firms may thus feel less 
market discipline in their role as fiduciaries and entrepreneurs.48 On the 
other hand, index investors also hold large positions in all the clients of 
any uncompetitive firms,49 none of whom would benefit from paying 
inflated prices. So, the extent to which passive investing creates an 
uncompetitive landscape is far from settled. 
Of course, passive investing is already on the rise,50 even in the 
absence of TSP-II. And there is little reason to believe that, without a TSP-
II, passive investing will not continue to grow just as dramatically. 
Individual investors and disparate defined contribution plans are already 
avid consumers of S&P 500 index funds, ETFs, and other passive funds.51 
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380 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:367 
So, to the extent that a massively indexed investing landscape lies in our 
future, the marginal growth of that phenomenon attributable to a federal 
retirement plan like TSP-II should not be overstated. 
In an investment industry still dominated by actively managed funds, 
the growth of passive investing appears to be more a positive development 
than a pathological one. Of the 8,066 mutual funds currently offered, 7,645 
are actively managed, and they impose far higher fees than their indexed 
counterparts.52 Indeed, the latest developments in the exchange-traded 
funds involve efforts to register and promote actively managed ETFs, an 
oxymoronic and expensive solution to an unknown problem. 
Even if index investing is “eating the world,”53 it has a lot of its meal 
to finish—and it will do so with or without the presence of TSP-II. 
III. PROPOSAL II: STATE RETIREMENT PLANS 
For those persuaded that improvements to defined contribution plans 
are a good idea, at least three alternatives to TSP-II exist: multi-employer 
plans, direct regulation of employers, and state-run retirement plans (using 
a defined contribution rather than a defined benefit pension structure). The 
first two of these options suffer significant problems of their own. Multi-
employer plans require intricate coordination between disparate—even 
rival—firms and come with complex regulation. Command regulation 
requiring employers to establish and mimic a TSP-II in their own defined 
contribution plans would involve uncomfortably heavy-handed federal 
interference in private operations, and would almost certainly forfeit the 
chief advantage of large economies of scale. Accordingly, I will focus on 
the state plan alternative. 
As it happens, a certain amount of ferment already exists at the state 
level—perhaps too much. Approximately half a dozen states are 
considering or have already enacted legislation authorizing a TSP-like 
defined contribution plan at the state level. One of them, California, is the 
Union’s largest economy and is also furthest along this path. Governor 
Brown recently signed a law establishing a plan entitled California Secure 
Choice (CSC), which went into effect on January 1, 2017.54 
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The new law requires California employers with more than five 
employees and no retirement plans of their own to enroll that population 
of 7.5 million employees automatically in CSC.55 Those employers were 
originally scheduled, beginning in 2018, to contribute three percent of 
covered employees’ salaries automatically to CSC, with automatic annual 
escalations of one percent to a maximum of eight percent.56 The details of 
some of these provisions have come into doubt, however, because of 
recent federal legislation that curtails the ability of state retirement plans 
to use automatic enrollment.57 Nevertheless, legislators in California and 
other states have announced their intention to proceed regardless of the 
new federal impediment.58 
Employers are not obliged to match employee contributions, and 
employees can opt out or alter these default settings.59 Their CSC accounts 
will follow them to any future jobs they hold, at least within California. 
Like TSP, the plan will be overseen by a state board of officials, while 
investment and administrative services will be outsourced to private 
vendors.60 In effect, CSC is quite true to the TSP, just at a state level. The 
largest difference is that the enacting legislation contemplates that CSC 
assets will be invested only in Treasury securities, not mutual funds.61 
Other states, including Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington, are contemplating 
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variants of similar plans.62 So would a federalism of finance work better 
than a national TSP-II? 
A. Potential Benefits 
1. Immediacy 
As the passage and schedule of CSC demonstrates, one benefit of 
pursuing a state approach is the possible immediacy of enactment. The 
coordination problems and general sclerosis of our federal political 
apparatus—at least in recent years—suggest that a federal approach may 
be many years distant. A Trump administration, with a compliant Senate 
and House, might possibly follow Senator Rubio’s initiative and endorse 
such a plan more quickly.63 But early evidence suggests that the one-party 
rule has not made the passage of legislation much easier. Also, retirement 
security was featured very little as a topic of policy in the recent 
presidential campaign and, even if attractive to the new administration, it 
does not yet seem to be a top priority. So, speed of enactment and 
implementation certainly is an advantage of pursuing this idea at the state 
level. 
2. Experimentation 
Of course, the classic chestnut of federalism—that the state petri 
dishes permit experimentation—is as true on this subject as it so often is. 
With states varying their offerings, as their initial legislation suggests they 
are doing, we could study the effects of large versus small menus of 
offerings, aggressive versus conservative investment choices, and ETFs 
versus mutual funds, as well as the comparative performance of a wide 
range of asset managers. Indeed, a federalist approach could nurture a far 
broader population of plan managers—and certainly not pose anything 
like the winner-take-all monopsony risks present with a single, national 
TSP-II. 
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B. Possible Drawbacks 
1. Lesser Economies of Scale & Higher Fees 
One of the largest problems with a state system is the dramatic drop 
in possible economies of scale. Dividing the assets of eligible employees 
into fifty different buckets will ensure that each bucket is significantly 
smaller than a federal cistern. Implementation and administrative costs, 
duplicated fifty different times, will represent a far greater aggregate 
expense in a multi-state system. Nevertheless, some states, such as 
California, may possess sufficient numbers of participants and assets to 
yield far better investment options than their citizens currently enjoy. So, 
on the question of financial benefit alone, state plans are likely not to be 
as compelling as a single federal plan but are still likely to be a significant 
improvement over the status quo. 
2. Balkanization & Lock-In 
A second, perhaps more intractable, problem with a state approach is 
the barriers it would impose on the mobility of citizens within the United 
States. California, after all, can compel only Californian employers to 
participate in its Secure Choice plan. So, a worker interested in leaving 
California would need to establish a new account in a different state for 
future contributions while maintaining the CSC account. A balkanized 
patchwork of savings plans would increase friction upon employee 
mobility. Employees would have to research and consider the relative 
merits of different retirement regimes in each of the different states they 
consider for employment. Economies and individuals rarely benefit in the 
midst of such frictions.64 
One possible solution might be for states to agree to reciprocally 
transfer savings between their plans when citizens move across borders. 
But, as we have already seen in the initial handful of state proposals, these 
plans might have incommensurate attributes that would highly complicate 
such transfers. The Massachusetts plan, for instance, proposes to cover 
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only employees of non-profit corporations.65 The California plan, as we 
saw, invests only in Treasury bills,66 while others will almost certainly 
include broader arrays of choice. Even in the unlikely circumstance 
involving perfectly identical state plans, legislators or officials of the state 
must engage in bargaining to arrive at a compromise, or the federal 
government might be required, once again, to legislate recognition of the 
full faith and credit of state plans. 
3. Complexity 
With experimentation, of course, comes added complexity. And, to 
negotiate a state-based system, citizens will need to learn the varying 
details of many ostensibly similar but substantively disparate plans. Many 
systems—regulatory and tax, for example—impose such complexity 
already, but the existence of some is not an argument for adding more 
(particularly not when a federal alternative exists). Indeed, calls by both 
industry groups and consumers in various settings for federal preemption 
of state regimes might be predictably echoed here. 
4. Local Naïveté & Pay-to-Play 
State-based plans may also be afflicted by local operatives who are 
either too naïve or too canny. As is often the case with the human resources 
departments of smaller corporations, the state officials in charge of 
administering defined contribution plans may simply lack the expertise to 
decide or oversee critical components of their plans. Consider, for 
instance, one element of CSC: the plan imposes a cap of one percent on 
administrative costs.67 To a layperson, one percent may seem like a very 
low fee. Within the investing industry, however, fees of one percent or 100 
basis points are exorbitant, particularly in the context of very large pools 
of assets such as these. And, California is sure to be one of the most 
sophisticated and powerful states in this field. One might reasonably fear 
that some state plans will be taken advantage of by, for instance, 
investment advisors that invest expensively or charge inordinate 
administrative costs. Indeed, many such firms have spent many of the past 
few years defending lawsuits alleging precisely such behavior in the 
defined contribution plans of employers—and, on occasion, in their own 
plans. 
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Conversely, state officials have at times been all-too-cute regarding 
the management of public savings. In New York, for instance, and most 
prominently, officials have been prosecuted for pay-to-play schemes with 
public pension funds.68 Officials have solicited bribes in exchange for the 
appointment of friendly asset managers—often woefully inexperienced, 
inexpert, or prone to charge too much—to the lucrative position of 
managing state pension funds. With as many as fifty different plans to 
monitor, it may be hard for public watchdogs to police this behavior 
throughout the nation. And even with close scrutiny, politicians will surely 
feel some pressure to appoint politically supportive financial firms to 
manage what are sure to be large pools of savings. 
CONCLUSION 
The merits of a federal savings plan outweigh those of a state-based 
system, and the presence of any system is certainly superior to none. The 
actions by California and other states may, alas, interfere with the impetus 
of federal actors to pursue a national plan. To date, the greatest 
impediment to states moving forward with their plans has been federal 
legislation just introduced by Republican congressional representatives 
opposed to state plans.69 If there is a legislative lull, perhaps the state 
initiatives will, more optimistically, serve as a goad to federal actors to 
move quickly to forestall a spreading patchwork of plans. Perhaps the 
poorest outcome is the status quo, in which pensions have been eliminated 
from the U.S. private sector and in which we now impede meaningful 
efforts by workers to combine their bargaining power to improve the 
health of their retirement savings. 
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